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Abstract 
I relied on the subjective group dynamics framework to analyse the derogation of 
inparty candidates involved in negative campaigns. In an experimental study (dynamic 
simulation of an electoral campaign, N = 118), I found that participants downgraded the 
inparty candidate (both in terms of evaluation and vote choice) more when he ran a 
person-based negative campaign than when he ran an issue-based negative campaign. 
This effect was significant for participants with high levels of political identification 
only. Overall, the findings revealed that political candidates, as members of significant 
social groups, are not exempt from the forms of extremity in evaluations typically 
observed in other social groups.   
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Negative campaigns, i.e. electoral campaigns in which candidates attack their opponents 
just as often as they present their own standing on political issues, are widely spread 
across the world (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995).  Even if candidates often resort to 
negative messages with the purpose of damaging the public image of their opponents, 
empirical results on their persuasive effects are mixed (cf. Lau, Sigelman, & Rovner, 
2007). In fact, there is some evidence that negative campaigning can backfire (e.g., 
Carraro, Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010). In this study, I relied on the subjective group 
dynamics theory (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, 
Paez, & Martinez Taboada, 1998; Pinto, Marques, & Paez, 2016) to analyse the 
derogation of inparty candidates involved in negative campaigns.  
Subjective Group Dynamics Theory 
 The subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT) is based on the social identity 
theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1981) and on the idea that people derive much of their self-concept 
from their membership in social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For this reason, they 
are motivated to uphold a favourable view of the ingroup as a whole by differentiating 
the ingroup from the outgroup and by supporting adherence to generic prescriptive 
norms, i.e. norms related to universal values and standard of behaviour that apply to 
both ingroup and outgroup. The basic idea of SGDT is that deviant ingroup members 
(those who oppose generic prescriptive norms) represent a threat to the subjective 
validity of positive intergroup differentiation and to a positive social identity (Marques 
et al., 1998).  
 According to the SGDT, one way to face this threat is the devaluation of the 
deviant ingroup member (cf. black sheep effect, Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; 
Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988), as an attempt to re-establish the positivity of the ingroup 
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(Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). In other words, the devaluation the deviant 
ingroup members signals that the undesirable behaviour should not be taken as a 
reflection of the characteristics of the entire group. In this way, people could preserve 
their positive self-concept via the protection of the subjective quality of the ingroup and 
of positive intergroup differentiation (Marques et al., 1998). The violation of a generic 
norm creates uncertainty about the ingroup superiority by reducing the fit between the 
ingroup and the superordinate group (cf., Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). A recent 
meta-analysis on the extremity effects in the evaluation of group members confirmed 
that “group-based motives are relevant to evaluation, and that most norm-violating 
behaviours engender negative evaluations of ingroup members” (Bettencourt et al., 
2016, p. 65).     
 Norm-violating ingroup members represent a threat to the positive image of the 
ingroup as they jeopardize the ingroup reputation. Building on previous research 
indicating that people are generally unaffected by threats in identity-irrelevant domains 
(e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Harter, 1986), a few studies investigated the moderating 
role of ingroup identification in relation to extremity effects. For example, Branscombe 
and colleagues (1993) found that a disloyal ingroup member was negatively evaluated 
by participants with high identification with the ingroup but not by participants with low 
levels of identification. Other studies reached the same conclusion that identification 
with the ingroup moderates the extent to which group members react to a threat to the 
ingroup (cf., Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002; Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; 
Hutchison, Abrams, Gutierrez, & Viki, 2008): The stronger the identification with the 
ingroup, the stronger the rejection of the deviant (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, & 
Leemans, 2001).      
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Negative Campaigns and Group Dynamics 
 In this study, I build on the idea that political groups may constitute significant 
sources of social identity. Since political identification affects political evaluations and 
behaviours just as other forms of group identification (e.g., Greene, 1999; Huddy, 2001; 
Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, & Russo, 2016), I suggest that the subjective group dynamic 
framework could be of high relevance to uncover the conditions under which negative 
campaigns backfire.   
Previous research showed that negative messages could cause a backlash effect 
against the source (Budesheim, Houston, & DePaola, 1996; Garramone, 1984; Roddy & 
Garramone, 1988). However, other studies showed that going negative in some cases 
does not affect (and even improve) the evaluations of the candidates who adopt such 
strategy (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Kaid, 1997; Schultz & Pancer, 1997). 
Overall, even if empirical findings suggest that negative campaigns have a net backlash 
effect on the attacker, “it does not do so decisively enough to support the conclusion 
that attacks exact a significantly greater toll on attackers than on their targets” (Lau et 
al., 2007, p. 1183).   
This puzzling scenario indicates that the backlash effect of political attacks 
might be conditional rather than pervasive. Previous research suggested that two main 
factors might moderate the effects of political negative messages, i.e. the content of the 
messages and the membership of the source. In accordance with the need to avoid a 
broad definition of negative campaigning (Richardson, 2001), research showed that 
differentiating between issue-based and person-based political attacks is essential to 
understand when a backlash effect is likely to occur. Issue-based negative messages, 
i.e., attacks bearing criticisms on political issues, are typically judged as fair attacks; on 
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the contrary, person-based negative messages, i.e., attacks focused on personal 
characteristics of the opponent, are in contrast with social norms that prescribe fairness 
in interpersonal relations and are mostly evaluated as unfair play (Stevens, Sullivan, 
Allen, & Alger, 2008). In other words, attacking the opponent on personal issues is a 
norm-violating behaviour, whereas attacking on issue-based topics is a norm-consistent 
behaviour in electoral campaigns.   
 The second factor is related to membership, i.e., the political affiliation of the 
candidate and of voter. Matthews and Dietz-Uhler (1998) observed that voters 
identifying with the sponsor candidate’s political party (i.e., inparty candidate) rated the 
sponsor less favourably after viewing negative advertisements, disliking that a member 
of their own group engaged in a disapproved tactic. More recently, Carraro and Castelli 
(2010) fine-tuned these results, showing that the preference for the inparty candidate 
almost disappeared when s/he used a person-based negative campaign compared to 
when s/he used an issue-based negative campaign. These results are in line with the 
social psychological research presented above showing that, when people are 
categorized into groups, the evaluations of their own and other groups are often biased. 
However, it could be argued that, in the highly competitive context of electoral 
campaigns, one way to assure the superiority of the ingroup is through winning the 
election. For instance, one possibility could be that highly identified voters would be 
concerned with achieving the group success by supporting their candidate 
independently from his/her campaign strategy (Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007).   
The Present Study 
 In the present study, I relied on the subjective group dynamics framework to 
analyse the derogation of inparty candidates involved in negative campaigns. To the 
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best of my knowledge, this is the first study that takes simultaneously into account three 
key factors to explain extremity effects in this context: The content of the campaign, i.e. 
issue- vs. person-based; the membership of the source, i.e. inparty vs. outparty 
candidate, and the group identification, i.e. political identification with the party. I 
reasoned that, if political groups are significant sources of social identity, the derogation 
of norm-violating inparty candidates (attacking the opponent on personal issues) should 
reflect voters’ motives to maintain a positive image of their own party. These motives 
should be stronger among highly identified partisans. Therefore, I anticipated that voters 
would downgrade the inparty candidate more when he runs a person-based negative 
campaign than when he runs an issue-based negative campaign. I expected this effect to 
be significant for voters with high levels of political identification only. Finally, I also 
investigated whether the downgrading of the inparty candidate would be reflected both 
at an attitudinal (i.e., evaluation) and at a behavioural level (i.e., vote choice).    
 I also aimed to overcome some of the limitations of the traditional experimental 
procedures used to investigate the effects of negative campaigning. Three common 
problems jeopardize the ecological validity of previous research. First, participants are 
typically exposed to only one or two advertisements or messages (cf., for example, 
Brooks & Geer, 2007; Clinton & Lapinski, 2004), with a dramatic simplification of the 
real-world dynamics of electoral campaigns. Second, the controlled environment of 
laboratory settings usually gives subjects no choice but to be exposed to negative 
messages; hence, people are likely to pay more attention to the messages presented by 
the experimenter than they would do in their everyday life (Sigelman & Kugler, 2003). 
Third, asking participants about their reaction right after having been exposed to 
political messages might induce them to reflect more deeply or differently about the 
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messages than they usually do (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2005). In this study, I used the 
Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE, Redlawsk & Lau, 2009), a computer-
based platform that allows simulating fictitious campaign environments in a dynamic 
fashion. Participants were presented with a great amount of information in the form of 
newspaper headlines, and could click on the title to read the correspondent full text 
(more details on the procedure are provided below). In this way, participants were 
provided with an environment rich of information, they freely selected the information 
they want to read, and they evaluated the candidates at the end of the entire electoral 
campaign.  
Method  
Participants and Design  
A sample of 118 Italian eligible voters (49.2% women; Mage = 37.03 years, SD = 
14.42) participated in this study, structured following a 2 (Inparty vs. Outparty) X 2 
(Person-Based vs. Issue-Based campaign) design, with the first factor varying within 
and the second factor varying between participants. All participants were recruited using 
a quota sampling procedure (the sample was equally divided as concerns gender and 
age—young people, under 45 years, and old people, over 45 years) and their 
participation was voluntary. They completed the task individually in their home guided 
by trained interviewers.  
Based on Redlawsk (2001, 2002), I used the DPTE to create a fictitious campaign 
environment. All participants were asked to play the role of a voter during an election in 
which a right-wing and a left-wing candidate ran for the open seat of their city mayor. 
The two candidates, while fictitious, were designed to represent a realistic ideological 
spectrum for their respective political positions. Participants were instructed to prepare 
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to cast a vote in the upcoming election by using the information available on the 
dynamic information board1. They have been randomly assigned to one of the following 
experimental conditions: (a) person-based negative campaign environment (n = 53, 
49.1% women; Mage = 37.66, Mpolitical orientation = 3.91); (b) issue-based negative 
campaign environment (n = 65, 49.2% women; Mage = 36.52, Mpolitical orientation = 4.12). 
Procedure and Materials 
The entire study was conducted as a computer-based experiment. The DPTE 
(Redlawsk & Lau, 2009) was used to present all information and to collect all data. 
After completing a pre-experimental questionnaire assessing their interest in politics, 
partisanship, political identification, and past voting behaviour, participants were 
instructed about the system functioning and their task, and were taken through a two-
minute trial run of the dynamic information board. After the trial, they looked at the 
picture of the fictitious candidates and read a brief description of their political career 
and party orientation. Before the beginning of the simulated campaign, participants 
evaluated the candidates based on these first descriptions.   
 During the experiment, participants were presented with a series of quickly 
changing headlines: Political and personal information about each candidate was 
available as well as endorsements, polls, and non-political information2. A total amount 
                                                          
1 Participants read the following text: “Imagine you just moved in a new city. In a few weeks, the 
elections for the city mayor will take place. The mayor in office cannot be re-elected. There are two new 
candidates, but you do not know anything about them. During the electoral campaign, voters usually have 
a lot of information available coming from different sources (newspapers, friends, TV, internet, 
associations, the candidates themselves, and so on). Nobody can pay attention to all this information, and 
this is the case in this electoral campaign as well. You need to choose which information to read. As in 
the trial, you will see some headings scrolling down the screen. To read the full text, you can click on the 
heading and it will open up. If you are not interested in a heading, let it scrolling down and do not click 
on it”.  
2 Political information about the candidates included their stands on political issues relevant for a city 
mayor race (e.g., stands on traffic, kindergartens, social housing, youth centers, and drug control). 
Personal information included candidates’ socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age, religion, 
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of 92 pieces of information scrolled down on the computer screen in random order 
during the campaign simulation. Each piece of information appeared twice on the 
screen. Information titles had the appearance of a newspaper headline and, when a 
participant clicked on it, the corresponding full text appeared in a new window. While 
the full text was read, the scrolling continued in the background creating a cost in terms 
of missed information and mimicking the dynamic nature of election information flow. 
The information available during the campaign was the same in both the experimental 
conditions; the only difference concerned the content of negative messages. Out of the 
92 pieces of information, 14 person-based negative messages (equally divided between 
messages coming from the inparty and the outparty candidate) were available in the 
person-based negative environment, while 14 issue-based negative messages (again 
equally divided between the two sources) were available in the other experimental 
condition. The nature of the messages was already disclosed in their headlines, so that 
participants had a first hint on their content (i.e, whether the attack was focused on 
political or personal issues; some samples of the messages are reported in the 
Appendix). While dynamically presenting information related to the electoral campaign, 
the system unobtrusively tracks the information selection and reading behaviour of the 
participants. At the end of the campaign, which lasted about 10 minutes, participants 
evaluated the candidates and voted. They were thanked and debriefed.  
 This procedure allowed me to investigate the effects of negative campaigns on 
the derogation of the inparty candidate on two levels. First, I looked at the general effect 
                                                                                                                                                               
family, job experience). Endorsements related candidates to both political parties and associations (e.g., 
trade or consumers associations). Polls gave general information about the race (e.g., expected turn out 
rates). Finally, non-political information was related to a variety of topics, ranging from fictitious current 
events (e.g., a ferryboat sinking in India) to cinema news (e.g., the premières at the Cannes film festival). 
The full texts of these pieces of information are available from the author.      
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of the campaign environment (person-based vs. issue-based negative campaign), i.e., the 
effect of the experimental manipulation. Second, I analysed whether this effect was 
explained by the exposure to person-based negative messages delivered by the inparty 
candidate.    
Measures  
Political identification. Three 9-category items from Barreto and Ellemers’ 
(2000) identification scale (e.g. “I’m a very good example of right/left-wing voter”) 
were used to assessed political identification. Based on α = .71, I computed a political 
identification index by averaging the answers to these items.    
 Evaluations of candidates. Participants evaluated the candidates twice on a 
scale ranging from 0 (very negative evaluation) to 10 (very positive evaluation), the first 
time right before the campaign began (T0) and the second once the campaign was over 
(T1). I used participants’ political orientation (reported on a 10-point left-right axis) to 
recode the evaluations of the right-wing and the left-wing candidates into evaluations of 
inparty or outparty candidate. More specifically, participants who reported a score lower 
or equal to 5 were considered left-wingers, whereas participants who reported a score 
higher or equal to 6 were considered right-wingers.  
 Vote choice. At the end of the campaign simulation, participants expressed their 
vote choice. They could either indicate one of the two candidates or decide not to vote. 
To obtain a balanced dependent variable, I aggregated the participants who voted for the 
outparty candidate (n = 8) and those who decided not to vote (n = 22). I created a 
dichotomous variable contrasting the vote for the inparty candidate (1) vs. vote for the 
outparty candidate or the decision of not voting (0). 
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 Exposure to negative messages. To get a better understanding of the effects of 
negative campaigns, I also analysed participants’ exposure to negative messages.  I 
created four measures of exposure: (a) person-based negative messages delivered by the 
inparty candidate, (b) person-based negative messages delivered by the outparty 
candidate, (c) issue-based negative messages delivered by the inparty candidate, (d) 
issue-based negative messages delivered by the outparty candidate. All of them were 
computed as the sum of the messages accessed and read by the participants during the 
entire campaign.    
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among all the variables are reported in 
Table 1. The means for the evaluations of the inparty and outparty candidates at T0 and 
T1 are in line with the idea that people tend to like inparty members more than outparty 
members, as suggested by the ingroup favoritism (e.g., Tajfel, 1970). Party 
identification was not related to the candidates’ evaluations at T0 but it was significantly 
associated with the candidates’ evaluations at T1 and the vote choice. The stronger the 
political identification of the participant, the higher the evaluation of the inparty 
candidate at T1 and the probability of casting a vote for him. Similarly, the stronger the 
political identification, the lower the evaluation of the outparty candidate. These 
associations support the claim that ingroup favoritism is accentuated among highly 
identified members, even in the political context (Green, 1999). In relation to 
participants’ exposure to negative messages, descriptive statistics revealed that 
participants tended to read issue-based messages more often than person-based 
messages. I found no significant associations between participants’ political 
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identification, evaluations of the candidates, and vote choice and the number of 
messages opened during the campaign.  
 To test the hypotheses, I examined if the evaluations of candidates and the vote 
choice were affected by the experimental conditions, participants’ level of political 
identification, and their interaction. Even if a pre-test showed no likeability difference 
between the pictures and profiles of the fictitious candidates3, based on Meffert et al. 
(2006) in all the following analyses I controlled for the evaluations of the 
inparty/outparty candidates reported before the beginning of the campaign (T0). I 
standardized all the independent variables entered in the models, and I coded the 
experimental manipulation as +1 (person-based attacks) and -1 (issue-based attacks). 
The results of the moderated regression models (Process, Model 1, Hayes, 2013) are 
reported in Table 2. Both the evaluations of candidates at T0 significantly predicted the 
evaluations at T1. As expected, the experimental manipulation had a negative effect on 
the evaluation of the inparty candidate but not on the evaluation of the outparty 
candidate, such that the inparty candidate was evaluated more negatively when he 
presented person-based messages than when he presented issue-based messages, 
whereas the evaluation of the outparty candidate was unaffected by the type of negative 
campaign. The negative effect on the evaluation of the inparty candidate was further 
qualified by the level of political identification, as suggested by the significant 
interaction term. Simple slopes analysis showed that the person-based negative 
campaign (vs. issue-based negative campaign) led to a lower evaluation of the inparty 
candidate among highly identified (+1 SD) participants (M = 5.56 in the person-based 
                                                          
3 I asked 57 psychology students to rate the candidates’ pictures and profiles in terms of attractiveness and 
competence, on scales from 1 to 10. To avoid party biases in their evaluations, I masked the information 
related to the party affiliation of the candidates. I found significant differences between the two 
candidates neither for attractiveness, t(56) = .30, p = .76, nor for competence, t(56) = -1.03, p = .31.   
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campaign, M = 7.27 in the issue-based campaign), simple slope = -.86, t(113) = -3.32, p 
< .01, 95%, CI [-1.368, -0.345], but not among participants with low levels of political 
identification (- 1 SD), simple slope =  -.13, t(113) = -.52, p = .60, 95%, CI [-0.640, 
0.373] (M = 5.57 in the person based-campaign, M = 5.83 in the issue-based campaign). 
In line with the SGDT, this analysis showed that high identifiers tended to like the 
inparty candidate less in the person-based than in the issue-based campaign condition. 
Low identifiers did not report statistically different likeability rates in the two campaign 
conditions.    
 In relation to participants’ vote choice (third column, Table 2), the results 
indicated that the evaluation of the inparty candidate at T0 had a positive significant 
effect on the probability of voting for this candidate. The negative effect of the 
experimental manipulation indicated that being in a person-based negative campaign 
environment reduced the chance to cast a vote for the inparty candidate, whereas the 
positive effect of political identification suggested that high identifiers tended to vote 
more for the inparty candidate than low identifiers did. Even though the interaction term 
between political identification and the experimental manipulation only approached 
statistical significance (p = .08), the simple slope analysis indicated that the person-
based negative campaign (vs. issue-based negative campaign) reduced the probability of 
voting for the inparty candidate (probability .70 vs .95) for highly identified participants 
(simple slope = -1.06, p < .05, 95%, CI [-1.883, -0.229]) but not for low identified 
participants (probability .64 vs .72, simple slope =  -.16, p = .58, 95%, CI [-0.747, 
0.419]). These findings are in line with the idea that a person-based campaign 
environment might have detrimental effects on the likelihood of voting for the inparty 
candidate, either pushing voters away from the polls or pushing them towards the rival 
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candidate. Again, this negative effect seems to work especially for highly identified 
voters, even though this last finding should be interpreted with caution.    
 Results from this first analysis thus showed that a campaign environment in 
which candidates attack each other on personal issues led high identifiers to downgrade 
the inparty but not the outparty candidate. It could be argued that participants in the 
person-based campaign environment tended to downgrade the inparty candidate because 
of a successful strategy of the opponent, i.e., a persuasive effect of the opponent’s 
negative campaign. However, according to the SGDT, this effect should be driven by 
the anti-normative behaviour of the ingroup member, i.e. inparty candidate delivering 
person-based negative messages. I tested a moderated mediation model (Process, Model 
14, Hayes, 2013), in which the effect of the experimental manipulation on the 
evaluation of the inparty candidate was explained (mediated) by the number of person-
based messages from the inparty, and the effect of this latter variable was moderated by 
the level of political identification. Figure 1 reports the results of this analysis and 
shows that being in the person-based campaign environment had a positive effect on the 
number of person-based negative messages delivered by the inparty candidate that 
participants read. In addition, the negative effect exerted by exposure to person-based 
negative messages coming from the inparty candidate on his evaluation was significant 
for highly identified (+ 1 SD) participants, simple slope = -0.75, t(112) = -2.67, p < .01, 
95% CI [-1.304, -0.192], but not for those with low (- 1 SD) level of political 
identification, simple slope = 0.08, t(112) = 0.21, p = .84, 95% CI [-0.581, 0.716] (see 
Figure 2). Consistent with this, the indirect effect (using bootstrapping with 5,000 
resamples to compute 95% confidence intervals) of the experimental manipulation on 
the inparty evaluation was significant for participants with high levels of political 
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identification – effect = -.51; SE = .23, 95% CI [-0.989, -0.070] – but not for those with 
low levels of political identification – effect = .05, SE = .23, 95% CI [-0.479, 0.460].4 
Overall, these results support the idea that the negative effect of the person-based 
campaign environment on the evaluation of the inparty candidate is explained by the 
inparty anti-normative behaviour, namely the use of person-based negative messages. 
The downgraded evaluation of the inparty candidate was observed only among highly 
identified participants, supporting the claim that the rejection of deviant members 
should be stronger when ingroup identification is higher (Coull et al., 2001).      
Discussion 
The aim of the current research was to examine the derogation of inparty 
candidates in the context of negative campaigning. Building on Stevens and colleagues’ 
(2009), who showed that person-based negative messages are perceived as less fair than 
issue-based negative messages, I hypothesized that exposure to person- vs. issue-based 
negative messages delivered by an inparty candidate would worsen his evaluation. 
Moreover, based on the idea that people’s political identity is one of the bases of their 
social identity (Greene, 1999; Huddy, 2001), I expected this effect to be significant for 
highly identified participants only. The results revealed that highly identified voters 
participating in an electoral campaign in which candidates attack each other on personal 
issues (vs. a campaign in which they criticize the opponent’s stand on political matters) 
tended to downgrade the inparty candidate for using such a strategy. Moreover, the 
                                                          
4 I tested the same model with the other measures of exposure (person-based negative messages from the 
outparty, issue-based negative messages from the inparty, and issue-based negative messages from the 
outparty). Neither the direct effects of exposure nor the interactions terms reached statistical significance 
in all the models tested. As a control, I also used the same model to predict the evaluation of the outparty 
candidate. Political identification was the only predictor that had a significant negative effect (b = -0.71, 
SE = .18, p < .001), beyond the effect of the evaluation of the candidate at T0 (b = 0.54, SE = .18, p < .01). 
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number of person-based negative messages delivered by the inparty candidate during 
the electoral campaign mediated this effect.  
The findings lent support to the hypotheses showing that an inparty candidate 
engaging in a communication strategy that breaks the social norms prescribing fairness 
in interpersonal relationships is downgraded by his own constituency, especially by the 
highly identified partisans. Even if the present study did not provide direct evidence 
about this, based on the subjective group dynamic theory, this derogation could be 
interpreted as a signal that partisans refuse the candidate’s behaviour to be a reflection 
of their entire political ingroup, plausibly to maintain high their own self-concept. In 
general, these findings confirmed that social psychological frameworks could be 
fruitfully applied to the political domain.    
 In relation to the political communication strategy, this study conveys two main 
messages. First, person-based negative campaigns may be ineffective in persuading low 
identified voters. This is relevant when considering that, in many political contexts, 
electoral campaigns are tailored to the undecided voters who are especially prone to 
campaign persuasion (e.g., Hillygus & Jackman, 2003), and that undecided voters 
typically show low levels of political identification (e.g., Kosmidis & Xezonakis, 2010). 
This study showed that low identified voters were relatively impervious to attacks on 
personal issues or, more precisely, they considered these attacks equivalent to the issue-
based ones. In other words, neither their evaluation of the inparty candidate nor their 
vote choice were affected by the campaign environment that they experienced. 
Second, person-based negative campaigns may also have serious negative 
effects on the most loyal partisans on whom candidates typically count on. This is 
interesting for two main reasons. First, since in Western democracies general and 
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presidential elections are often won by a slender margin (Roccato & Zogmaister, 2010), 
even small shifts in voting preferences may have decisive, direct effects on the 
election’s results. Second, the disinvestment of the most partisan citizens from the 
electoral campaign could be indirectly detrimental on the election’s result, in that it 
would plausibly prevent them for engagement and activism in the campaign. Candidates 
running for election should then avoid person-based attacks in favour of the more 
informative and correct criticisms on political issues.  
 The main strength of this study was the adoption of a complex experimental 
procedure (the DPTE, Redlawsk & Lau, 2009). The advantages of this method mainly 
concern the possibility to examine participants’ selective exposure to negative 
messages, the “here today, gone tomorrow” flowing information, and, most importantly 
for the present research, the availability of a great amount of information. Previous 
experimental studies on the effects of negative campaigns were based on forced 
exposure to very few information (mostly negative) about the dislikeable candidate. In 
this study, participants were free to read negative messages along with a great amount 
of positive or neutral information regarding the competing candidates. This is especially 
important today given that the contemporary post-broadcast era is characterized by a 
proliferation of information and media choices (Prior, 2007).        
 In this experiment, I simulated a two-party system by introducing two candidates 
only. This choice allowed me to simplify the experimental procedure and to gain results 
comparable with those from previous studies on the topic. However, in future research it 
would be interesting to explore whether the extremity effects in the evaluation of 
candidates can also be observed in multi-party systems, in which many short-lasting 
parties typically compete in the political arena (see for instance Corbetta, Cavazza, & 
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Roccato, 2009). It could be argued that parties are perceived as less entitative (i.e., less 
inalterable and with more permeable boundaries) in multi-party systems than in bipolar 
systems. If this is the case, we should expect less extremity in the evaluation of 
candidates as previous research showed that ingroup derogation emerge only when the 
groups are entitative and central to the participants’ self-images (Lewis & Sherman, 
2010). Similarly, it would be interesting to examine if similar effects emerge when 
candidates are part of broader political coalitions. Future studies performed by 
considering different political systems and testing the potential moderating role of the 
perception of entitativity will lead to a better understanding of this phenomenon. 
 Another interesting line to follow in future studies is related to the role played by 
electoral polls. A long tradition of studies in political science and social psychology 
focused on a variety of effects exerted by the information provided by the polls on 
people’s vote choice, such as the “bandwagon” effect and the “underdog effect” (e.g., 
Mehrabian, 1998). In a research on the moderating factors of the black-sheep effect, 
Marques et al. (2001, Study 3) found that participants derogated ingroup deviants more 
when there was uncertainty vs. certainty about the ingroup superiority. Future studies 
addressing the interactive effect between exposure to person-based negative messages 
and to polls showing the inparty candidate as the winner vs. loser of the political 
competition would be very interesting.  
Conclusion 
 This research helped us to understand the extent to which extremity effects may 
be observed in the political domain. The findings revealed that political candidates, as 
members of significant social groups, are not exempt from the forms of extremity in 
evaluations typically observed in other social groups (Marques et al., 1998). This is 
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particularly relevant in the electoral context: Considering that the ultimate goal of 
candidates is to persuade voters to choose them, the current research allowed me to 
advance some suggestions to politicians in order to direct their communication 
strategies. The use of person-based negative messages showed to produce a backlash 
effect among highly identified partisans. Running an electoral campaign based on 
personal attacks may have serious detrimental effects for candidates by alienating their 
most loyal voters.   
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Appendix 
 
Two examples of person-based negative messages 
1. “He didn’t deserve his degree” 
In La Repubblica front page a harsh attack of Bianchini on Carli5 
Today La Repubblica reports a harsh attack of Bianchini on Carli: “Carli talks nonsense 
even when talking about issues he is supposed to be competent on. People who say he 
bought his university degree are clearly right. If a person buys his own degree, he is 
obviously not an honest and competent person. For Carli, words as ‘honesty’ and 
‘competence’ don’t have any value: He just uses them to lie to voters”. 
2.  “He used to be drunk and involved in fight when he was young”  
From La Repubblica: Carli attacks Bianchini: 
From today edition of La Repubblica, Carli’s attack to Bianchini: “Some of Bianchini’s 
friends said that, when completely drunk, he was involved in a fight in a pub. He was 
unhurt but his rival was hospitalized for a month. Bianchini’s past tells us that he is 
nothing good for our present”. 
 
Two examples of issue-based negative messages 
1. “He will make public transportation worse” 
La Repubblica reports that Bianchini attacked Carli’s political program  
Yesterday La Repubblica reported that Bianchini affirmed: “If Carli will be elected he 
will reduce the investment in the public transportation service. Is this a good solution to 
                                                          
5 “La Repubblica” is one of the major Italian newspapers; Bianchini and Carli were the names attributed 
to the fictitious candidates running in the campaign.     
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handle the public transports company’ budget troubles? Not at all. That’s only a way to 
favor those citizens who can afford and maintain a car, to all the others cost”. 
2. “Italians are not priority”  
First page in La Repubblica, Carli attacks Bianchini 
First page in La Repubblica, Carli attacks Bianchini: “If Bianchini will be elected, he 
will turn his back to his fellow citizens. Bianchini wants all immigrants to have access 
to council houses. If we are talking about houses built on Italians’ money, a city mayor 
should not put Italians aside”.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between all the variables used in the study 
 M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Experimental group -0.10 1.00 -.05 -.06 .08 -.25** .08 -.22* - - - - 
2. Political identification 4.52 1.59 - .14 .01 .23* -.35*** .22* .14 .10 -.07 -.02 
3. Inparty evaluation T0 5.76 2.06  - -.07 .39*** -.10 .29** .19 .18 .01 -.07 
4. Outparty evaluation T0 4.58 2.21   - -.01 .26** -.08 .04 .05 -.10 -.04 
5. Inparty evaluation T1 6.13 2.23    - -.26** .76*** -.12 -.08 .11 .11 
6. Outparty evaluation T1 3.08 2.07     - -.34*** -.10 -.12 .00 .17 
7. Vote for inparty 0.75 0.44      - -.13 -.16 .15 -.04 
8. Person-based messages from inpartya 2.13 1.73       - .53*** - - 
9. Person-based messages from outpartya 2.43 1.91        - - - 
10. Issue-based messages from inpartyb  3.26 2.12         - .44*** 
11. Issue-based messages from outpartyb 3.11 1.76          - 
Note. The experimental group is coded as 1 = person-based negative campaign, -1 = issue-based negative campaign.  
a Statistics are reported for participants in the person-based negative campaign condition (n = 53) 
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b Statistics are reported for participants in the issue-based negative campaign condition (n = 65)   
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
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Table 2. Moderated regression models predicting the evaluations of the inparty/ 
outparty candidates and vote for the inparty candidate as a function of the experimental 
manipulation and participants’ political identification. 
 Inparty 
evaluation T1 
Outparty 
evaluation T1 
Vote for 
inparty T1 
Inparty evaluation T0 .78(.18)*** - .67(.25)** 
Outparty evaluation T0 - .54(.17)** -.22(.26) 
Experimental group (1 = person-based 
negative campaign) 
-.50(.18)** .09(.17) -.61(.26)* 
Political identification .36(.18) -.71(.17)*** .57(.26)* 
Experimental group*political 
identification 
-.36(.18)* .13(.17) -.45(.26)^ 
R2 .26 .19 .26 
ΔR2 due to the interaction 
.03 
F(1,113) = 
3.96* 
.00 
F(1,113) = 
0.57 
.03 
χ2(1) = 
3.15^ 
Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients for inparty/outparty 
evaluation and logistic regression coefficients for inparty vote (standard errors in 
parentheses). For inparty vote Nagelkerke R2 is reported.   
***p < .001, **p < .05, *p < .05, ^ p < .10 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Moderated mediation model predicting the evaluation of the inparty 
candidate as a function of experimental condition (person- vs. issue-based negative 
campaign), exposure to person-based negative messages from the inparty candidate, and 
political identification. Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in 
parentheses). * p < .05, ***p < .001 
Figure 2. Moderating effect of political identification on the link between 
exposure to person-based negative messages delivered by the inparty candidate and the 
inparty evaluation.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
